

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3217

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 USNATO 6052

SECTO 021

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12/31/81

TAGS PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S NAC STATEMENT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NAC STATEMENT PRESENTED BY
SECRETARY KISSINGER AT AFTERNOON SESSION, DECEMBER 10.
PLEASE PASS TEXT TO WHITE HOUSE NOW. TEXT MAY BE
REPEATED TO NATO CAPITALS WEDNESDAY PM WASHINGTON
TIME.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. MR. CHAIRMAN, IT HAS BEEN CUSTOMARY FOR
SECRETARIES OF STATE TO DISCUSS A VARIETY OF ISSUES
OF CURRENT CONCERN. BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE STATE OF
THE ALLIANCE REQUIRES THAT I DEVOTE MY REMARKS TODAY
TO THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND TO
THAT SUBJECT ALONE.

2. LET ME SAY HERE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT I OFTEN READ
OF TITANIC STRUGGLES IN THIS ALLIANCE THAT HAVE
NOT REALLY TAKEN PLACE. LET ME SAY THAT WE WILL

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BRIEF ONLY ON THE CONSTRUCTIVE PART OF THIS SPEECH,
AND WILL SAY NOTHING ABOUT THE OPENING SECTIONS WHICH
FRANKLY DESCRIBE OUR VIEW OF THAT HAS TRANSPIRED IN

THE EARLIER MONTHS OF THIS YEAR.

3. THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE HAS BEEN THE CENTRAL FACT OF THE POSTWAR ERA, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE FORMAL WORDS OF THE TREATY BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE SPIRIT AND COMMON INTERESTS THAT UNDERPIN THESE WORDS. THE ALLIANCE HAS PROVIDED THE ESSENTIAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE AND FOR WESTERN DEFENSE. AND IT HAS GIVEN US THE CONFIDENCE AND UNITY TO MOVE FROM CONFRONTATION TO NEGOTIATION IN RELATIONS WITH OUR ADVERSARIES.

4. FOR A QUARTER CENTURY THE UNITED STATES HAS REGULARLY RENEWED ITS COMMITMENT TO OUR CLOSEST AND OLDEST ALLIES. FROM THE FIRST DAYS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION WE HAVE TREATED TRANS-ATLANTIC UNITY AS THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. THAT IS WHY PRESIDENT NIXON'S FIRST TRIP ABROAD WAS TO EUROPE AND HIS FIRST STOP WAS HERE AT NATO HEADQUARTERS. AND THAT IS WHY HE HAS ASKED ME TO REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT TODAY.

THE YEAR OF EUROPE

5. LAST APRIL THE UNITED STATES UNDERTOOK TO REAFFIRM THE POSITIVE VISION THAT EVEN MORE THAN THE NEED FOR COMMON DEFENSE HOLDS THE NATIONS OF THE WEST TOGETHER. JEAN MONNET ONCE OBSERVED ABOUT THE ALLIANCE THAT "THE INESCAPABLE FORCES WHICH ARE MOULDING THE FUTURE BIND US MORE CLOSELY THAN MEMORIES OF THE PAST." THAT CONVICTION SHAPES AMERICA'S DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

6. THE U.S. PROPOSALS OF LAST APRIL ANTICIPATED MANY OF OUR CURRENT DIFFICULTIES. WE WERE CONCERNED THAT MEMORIES OF PAST COOPERATION WERE FADING. WE FEARED THAT DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF THE FUTURE WERE DIVIDING THE ALLIANCE. THE UNITED STATES THEREFORE PROPOSED A COLLECTIVE EFFORT OF ATLANTIC RENEWAL AND
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REFORM.

-- THERE IS A NEW GENERATION ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC THAT HAS NO EXPERIENCE OF EITHER THE EXTERNAL THREATS OR THE FEARS OF ABANDONMENT WHICH LED TO THE FOUNDING OF THE ALLIANCE.

-- IN THE RECENT PAST, FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS HAS BECOME IDENTIFIED IN THE PUBLIC MIND WITH IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH ADVERSARIES. RELATIONS WITH ALLIES, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE INCREASINGLY BEEN CHARACTERIZED

BY PETTY QUARRELS AND DRIFT.

-- THE EMERGING CONDITION OF NUCLEAR PARITY URGENTLY REQUIRES A RECONSIDERATION OF THE NATURE OF OUR SECURITY AND THE MEANS OF OUR COMMON DEFENSE. BUT THE POLITICAL WILL TO SUPPORT EVEN PRESENT DEFENSE EFFORTS HAS BEEN DECLINING IN ALL OUR COUNTRIES.

-- IN AN EVER MORE INTERDEPENDENT WORLD WE PARADOXICALLY CONFRONT INCREASING PRESSURES FOR ECONOMIC AUTARCHY AND POLITICAL DIFFERENTIATION. THREE DECADES AFTER BRETTON WOODS WE LACK AND AGREED VIEW OR COOPERATIVE MECHANISMS TO OVERCOME THE MALADJUSTMENTS OF A NEW ECONOMIC ERA.

-- IN DETENTE POLICIES WE HAVE MOVED MORE RAPIDLY INDIVIDUALLY THAN COLLECTIVELY. THIS HAS STRAINED OUR UNITY JUST AS WE ARE FACING FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS IN CSCE, MBFR, SALT AND IN BILATERAL SUMMIT MEETINGS.

7. THUS DETENTE AND DOMESTIC REALITIES URGENTLY REQUIRE AN ALLIANCE ORIGINALLY FOCUSSED ON DEFENSE TO DISCOVER A NEW SENSE OF DIRECTION. OUR PROPOSAL FOR A "YEAR OF EUROPE" WAS AN APPEAL FOR SUCH A SEARCH.

8. IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL, WE CONCEIVED THAT TH
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3218

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 6 USNATO 6052

SECTO 21

-- WE WERE AWARE OF EUROPEAN FEARS OF SOVIET-AMERICAN CONDOMINIUM. WE WERE CONVINCED THAT BY ENGAGING WITH EUROPE IN THE DEFINITION OF COMMON OBJECTIVES WE WOULD PROVIDE SUBSTANTIVE

REASSURANCE AND THEREBY PUT SUCH FEARS TO REST.

-- WE SHARED EUROPE'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE MAINTENANCE OF A VIABLE DEFENSE UNDER NEW STRATEGIC CONDITIONS. WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT WE COULD DEVISE A RATIONALE FOR THE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF AMERICAN FORCES ON THE BASIS OF A FAIR SHARING OF BURDENS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

-- EUROPE SEEMED TO FEEL THAT WE WERE NEGLECTING IT AND TREATING IT AS BUT ONE PLAYER IN A WORLD OF MULTIPLE POWER CENTERS. WE INTENDED TO ANCHOR OUR ALLIANCE RELATIONS IN A FIRM AND EQUAL PARTNERSHIP AND TO REASSERT ITS ABSOLUTE PRIORITY IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

-- AND WE BELIEVED THAT EUROPE'S INTENTION TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE AS A UNITED ENTITY REQUIRED A NEW UNDER-
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STANDING OF WHAT WE SHOULD DO JOINTLY AND A NEW EFFORT TO HARMONIZE WHAT EACH WANTED TO DO INDEPENDENTLY.

9. BUT I'M FRANK TO SAY, THE RESPONSE TO OUR INVITATION HAS NOT BEEN ENCOURAGING. WHILE SOME WELCOMED THE INITIATIVE, OTHERS ANALYZED IT TO DEATH, IGNORING ITS BASIC PURPOSE. WE DID NOT EXPECT AGREEMENT WITH EVERY SPECIFIC OF THE INITIATIVE, BUT WE DID EXPECT AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE HISTORIC CHALLENGE BEFORE US. WE DO NOT CLAIM THAT EVERY WORD OF OUR PROPOSAL WAS PERFECT, BUT WE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT WE WERE LAUNDERING AN ADVERSARY PROCESS AND THEREFORE DID NOT REVIEW EACH SENTENCE FROM A DEBATING PERSPECTIVE.

10. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT SINCE APRIL WE HAVE BEEN ENMESHED IN LEGALISTIC DISPUTES OVER LANGUAGE WHEN THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE SHAPING A NEW CONSENSUS ON OUR HIGHEST GOALS. THE RESPONSE OF MANY OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES HAS NOT GONE BEYOND A REPETITION -- AND IN SOME WAYS A DEEPENING -- OF THE VERY CONCERNS WHICH WE WERE SEEKING TO SATISFY.

-- SOME OBJECTED TO THE TIMING OF OUR INITIATIVE.

-- SOME SUSPECTED THAT BY STRENGTHENING THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP WE INTENDED TO SUBMERGE THE EVOLVING EUROPEAN IDENTITY.

-- SOME CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS OUR PURPOSE TO
CONFINE EUROPE TO A REGIONAL ROLE WHILE WE
PURSUED GLOBAL POLICIES.

-- SOME ACCUSED US OF USING OUR DEFENSE
COMMITMENTS TO EXTRACT ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS.

11. LET ME RESPOND TO EACH OF THESE INTERPRETA-
TIONS.

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FOR SEVERAL MONTHS PRECEDING THE APRIL SPEECH,
PRESIDENT NIXON AND I DISCUSSED OUR APPROACH WITH
MANY EUROPEAN LEADERS AND RECEIVED THEIR ENCOURAGE-
MENT. THERE WAS BROAD CONSENSUS THAT WE FACED
URGENT PROBLEMS AND ON THE NEED FOR A NEW COMMON
EFFORT. THEREFORE, FAR FROM FAILING TO CONSULT,
WE EXTENSIVELY EXPLORED IN ADVANCE THE CONCEPTS OF
OUR INITIATIVE.

THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY

12. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT THE
STRENGTHENING OF ATLANTIC UNITY AND DEFINING A
EUROPEAN PERSONALITY ARE INCOMPATIBLE. THE TWO PRO-
CESSES HAVE REINFORCED EACH OTHER FROM THE OUTSET
AND CAN AND SHOULD DO SO NOW. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY
AND EXPLICITLY WELCOMED THE EUROPEAN DECISION TO
CREATE AN INDEPENDENT IDENTITY. I REAFFIRM IT TODAY.
INDEED, OFTEN WE HAVE BEEN STRONGER SUPPORTERS
OF EUROPEAN UNITY THAN SOME EUROPEANS THEMSELVES.
AND AS MINISTERS IN THIS ROOM KNOW, WE HAVE
ENCOURAGED AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN DEFENSE EFFORTS.
THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTENTION OF TURNING ITS
BACK ON EUROPE AT THE VERY MOMENT EUROPE IS COMING
OF AGE.

13. BUT EUROPE ALSO MUST KNOW THAT THE MANNER IS
WHICH EUROPEAN UNITY IS EMERGING HAS RAISED
FUNDAMENTIAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF OUR
RELATIONSHIP AND THE FOUNDATION OF OUR ALLIANCE.

-- HOW DO THE NINE PROPOSE TO DEAL WITH US?

--- WHAT WILL BE THE CONTENT OF ITS POLICIES?

-- WHAT IS EUROPE'S CONCEPTION OF OUR
RELATIONSHIP?

14. EUROPE HAS BEEN SO ABSORBED IN DEFINING ITS
OWN IDENTITY THAT IT HAS NOT PAID ADEQUATE ATTENTION

TO THE PROFOUND IMPACT ON THE U.S. OF THE RECENT
PRACTICE OF NOT CONSULTING WITH US DURING THE

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FORMULATION OF ITS PLICIES.

15. I WILL READILY ADMIT THAT THE UNITED STATES
HAS SOMETIMES CONSULTED INADEQUATELY -- ESPECIALLY
IN RAPIDLY MOVING SITUATIONS. BUT THIS IS A
MATTER OF INADVERTENT PRACTICE -- AN OVERSIGHT
CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED POLICY. THE ATTITUDE
OF THE NINE, IN CONTRAST, ATTEMPTS TO MAKE REFUSAL
TO CONSULT INTO A PRINCIPLE. ACCORDING TO CURRENT
PRACTICE CONSULTATION IN ADVANCE OF A DECISION
HAS BEEN PRECLUDED AND CONSULTATION AFTER THE FACT
HAS BEEN DRAINED OF CONTENT; FOR THEN EUROPE
APPOINTS A SPOKESMAN WHO IS ONLY EMPOWERED TO
INFORM US OF THE COMMON DECISION AND WHO HAS NO

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16. AS A RESULT TWO STANDARDS OF CONSULTATION
HAVE EVOLVED IN THE ATLANTIC AREA. WITHIN NATO,
MEMBERS --- AND ESPECIALLY THE U.S. --- ARE ASKED
TO CONSULT ON ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR FOREIGN
POLICIES IN THEIR NATIONAL CAPACITY. BUT MATTERS
DEALT WITH BY THE NINE ARE CONCERTEED IN ADVANCE
AND THE ALLIES ARE THEN INFORMED. MOREOVER, ONLY
VERY INADEQUATE CONSULTATION IS POSSIBLE IN
BILATERAL CHANNELS. THE LONG-TERM DEBILITATING
EFFECT OF THIS SITUATION FOR THE ALLIANCE IS CLEAR.

17. WE ARE CONCERNED NOT ONLY WITH HOW DECISIONS ARE BEING MADE BUT WITH THE IMPACT OF THESE DECISIONS ON OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE RECOGNIZE THE COMMON RESPONSE OF THE NINE TO OUR INITIATIVE AS A HISTORIC STEP. NEVERTHELESS, WE CANNOT AVOID NOTING THAT A COMMON POSITION WAS ACHIEVED AT THE COST OF ANY SIGNIFICANT CONTENT FOR TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS. THUS WE AND EUROPE HAVE TO ASK WHAT THE CONCEPTION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP IS.

18. TOO MANY EUROPEAN STATEMENTS IMPLY THAT EUROPEAN IDENTITY HAS MEANING ONLY AS IT HIGHLIGHTS THE SEPARATENESS FROM THE UNITED STATES, THAT

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EUROPEAN UNITY MUST BE SOUGHT AT THE COST OF ATLANTIC UNITY.

19. I ADDRESS THESE ISSUES IN THIS FORUM BECAUSE A UNIFYING EUROPE HAS BEGUN TO MAKE POLITICAL DECISIONS WHICH INTIMATELY AFFECT THE INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE -- ESPECIALLY IF WE CONSIDER THAT THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION IS SUPPOSED TO BE COMPLETED BY 1980.

20. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADERS WHY WESTERN DEFENSE IS INDIVISIBLE, YET THE TERM "PARTNERSHIP" CANNOT BE USED TO CHARACTERIZE OUR RELATIONSHIP. AND AS A MATTER OF OBJECTIVE POLITICAL REALITY THE UNITED STATES' HISTORIC COMMITMENTS TO EUROPE WILL BE WEAKENED IF OUR MOTIVES ARE CONSTANTLY ATTACKED, IF OUR POLICIES ARE SYSTEMATICALLY MISINTERPRETED AND IF OUR ROLE IS DEFINED AS LITTLE MORE THAN THE SUPPLIER OF THE PHYSICAL SHIELD FOR POLICIES WHICH OCCASIONALLY ARE TAKING ON AN ADVERSARY CHARACTER.

21. WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP IS EUROPE WILLING TO HAVE WITH THE UNITED STATES? WE ARE NOT CONCERNED WITH THE WORD "PARTNERSHIP," BUT WITH THE STATE OF MIND IN EUROPE THAT THE REFUSAL TO USE THIS TERM IMPLIES.

22. AMERICA IS STILL PREPARED TO DEFINE AN ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP OF SHARED PURPOSES AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES. WE REMAIN WILLING -- INDEED EAGER -- TO DEDICATE OURSELVES TO A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION. THAT WAS THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF OUR INITIATIVE LAST APRIL. IT REMAINS THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TODAY.

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND ENERGY

23. LET ME TURN TO THE THIRD ELEMENT OF EUROPE'S RESPONSE TO OUR INITIATIVE -- THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO CONFINE EUROPE TO A REGIONAL ROLE, WHILE IT PURSUES GLOBAL POLICIES. THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE PROBLEM IS PRECISELY THE

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OPPOSITE.

24. WE HAVE LONG ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SPELLS OUT NO FORMAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMMON ACTION OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA. BUT SURELY OUR RESPECTIVE ACTIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN DEFINED BY LEGAL OBLIGATIONS ALONE.

25. THE FACT IS THAT WHEN WE CONSULTED KEY EUROPEAN LEADERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS CRISIS, WE WERE TOLD BY SOME THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST FIRST WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THAT THERE WAS LITTLE EUROPE COULD DO. THUS I WOULD LIKE TO ASK MY COLEAGUES WHETHER GREATER CONSULTATION WOULD HAVE MADE ANY DIFFERENCE, WHETHER IT WOULD HAVE CHANGED OUR DIVERGENT PERCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM.

26. FOR WE DIFFERED ON THREE CRUCIAL ISSUES:

-- WHETHER THE WAR WAS PRIMARILY AN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT;

-- WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE WAR WAS TO THE ENERGY CRISIS;

-- WHETHER EITHER EUROPE OR THE UNITED STATES COULD SOLVE ITS ENERGY PROBLEMS BY ISOLATED POLICIES.

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27. EUROPEANS HAD LONG URGED US TO MOVE MORE VIGOROUSLY TO SETTLE THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. I AM PREPARED TO GRANT THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT DO ALL THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEFORE THE WAR TO PROMOTE A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT. BUT ONCE THE WAR BEGAN, THE MASSIVE SOVIET AIRLIFT TURNED THE CRISIS INTO MORE THAN JUST AN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. THE UNITED STATES HAD SHOWN EXTREME RESTRAINT IN ITS RESUPPLY POLICY UNTIL THE SOVIET EFFORT REACHED THE POINT OF MASSIVE INTERVENTION. BUT WHEN THE AT HAPPENED, IT BECAME A QUESTION OF WHAT COUNTRIES WOULD SHAPE THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST -- AN AREA UPON WHICH EUROPE IS EVEN MORE VITALLY DEPENDENT THAN THE UNITED STATES. FROM THAT POINT ON, OUR MEASURES WERE DESIGNED NOT TO TAKE SIDES IN THE CONFLICT BUT TO PRESERVE THE POSSIBILITY OF PURSUING AFTER THE WAR THE OBJECTIVES SOME OF OUR ALLIES HAD URGED ON US EVER SINCE 1967.

28. WE WERE CONVINCED THAT WE HAD TO ACT IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT A SETTLEMENT COULD NOT IGNORE WESTERN INTERESTS. IT WAS PRECISELY TO CREATE THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC SETTING FOR AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT WITH WESTERN INFLUENCE AND TO PROTECT THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST THAT WE ACTED AS WE DID. THUS I MUST CONFESS WE WERE DEEPLY DISTURBED WHEN SOME IN EUROPE MOVED INTO OPEN

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OPPOSITION TO US. FOR WE BELIEVE THAT THE POSITION THE UNITED STATES NOW OCCUPIES -- AS THE ONLY INTERMEDIARY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES -- IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO EUROPE'S INTERESTS THAN TO OUR OWN.

29. SECOND, THE ENERGY CRISIS IS NOT PRIMARILY THE PRODUCT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR; IT IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE EXPLOSIVE SECULAR GROWTH FOR WORLDWIDE DEMAND OUT-RUNNING THE INCENTIVES FOR SUPPLY. THE MIDDLE EAST WAR MADE A CHRONIC CRISIS ACUTE, BUT WE WOULD HAVE FACED AN ENERGY PROBLEM EVEN IF THERE HAD BEEN NO WAR. AND SHOULD THE PRE-WAR PRODUCTION POLICIES OF THE ARABS BE RESTORED, THE PROBLEM OF MATCHING THE LEVEL OF OIL THE WORLD PRODUCES TO THE LEVEL IT CONSUMES WILL REMAIN TO BE SOLVED.

30. IF THIS ANALYSIS IS CORRECT, THE ONLY SOLUTION IS A LONG-TERM EFFORT -- TO PROVIDE PRODUCERS AN INCENTIVE

TO INCREASE THEIR SUPPLY, TO ENCOURAGE CONSUMERS TO CONSERVE EXISTING SUPPLIES, AND ABOVE ALL TO FIND ALTERNATE ENERGY SOURCES.

31. THIS IS A CHALLENGE WHICH THE UNITED STATES COULD SOLVE ALONE WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY AND THAT EUROPE CANNOT SOLVE IN ISOLATION AT ALL. WE PREFER AND YOU REQUIRE A COMMON EFFORT. IT IS A PROBLEM PAR EXCELLENCE FOR COOPERATION AMONG US.

32. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN EXACERBATED BY THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, IT CAN ONLY BE EASED BY BRINGING THE DISPUTE TO A RAPID CONCLUSION. BUT IF ANY OF THE PARTIES ARE ENCOURAGED BY ANYONE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN HOLD TO EXTREME POSITIONS OR TO MANEUVER AMONG OTHER COUNTRIES TO DISCOVER THE HIGHEST BIDDER FOR THEIR FAVOR, A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT -- THE ONLY ONE POSSIBLE -- WILL BE DELAYED. THUS A SCHISM BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE TENDS TO INCREASE THE OBSTACLES TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD AMELIORATE EUROPE'S ENERGY PROBLEM.

33. LET ME USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DEAL BRIEFLY WITH
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ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS THAT CAUSED MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US: THE DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES TO ALERT ITS FORCES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR ALERT AFFECTED ALL OF NATO, AND WE REGRET THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO CONSULT MORE FULLY IN ADVANCE. BUT IN RETROSPECT WE MUST ASK OURSELVES:

-- WAS THERE TIME FOR SUCH CONSULTATION?

-- WAS THE UNITED STATES WRONG IN ACTING?

-- WAS OUR ACTION AGAINST ALLIED INTERESTS?

34. IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DECISION TIME WAS A MATTER OF A FEW HOURS AND THAT THE ALLIES WERE NOTIFIED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH OUR REJECTION OF THE SOVIET NOTE. THE DECISION WAS PROMPTED BY THE HIGH STATE OF READINESS OF SOVIET AIRBORNE FORCES COUPLED WITH OTHER ACTIONS WHICH RAISED THE EXPLICIT AND UNMISTAKABLE POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIET COMBAT FORCES MIGHT INTERVENE -- FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER -- IN AN AREA NOT CONTIGUOUS TO THE USSR AND FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN THE PROTECTION OF A COMMUNIST REGIME. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A MOMENTOUS DECISION WITH PERHAPS IRREVERSIBLE CONSEQUENCES, FAR MORE SERIOUS FOR EUROPE EVEN THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES.

35. UNFORTUNATELY, AS PRESIDENT KENNEDY FOUND DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISES, THE BEST AMERICA CAN SOMETIMES DO IS TO INFORM ITS ALLIES IMMEDIATELY AFTER A DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN. BUT AS PRESIDENT DE GAULLE SAID AFTER DEAN ACHESON INFORMED HIM OF THE AMERICAN DECISION TO HALT SOVIET SHIPS, "I THINK THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD NO OTHER CHOICE... A GREAT GOVERNMENT SUCH AS YOURS DOES NOT ACT WITHOUT EVIDENCE."

36. SECOND, IN RETROSPECT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN ACTION, RATHER THAN ESCALATING THE CONFLICT, OPENED THE WAY TO STRENGTHENING THE CEASEFIRE AND TO THE PEACE NEGOTIATION, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL BEGIN SOON. OUR FAILURE TO ACT COULD WELL HAVE TURNED A CRISIS INTO A CONFLAGRA-

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39. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED TO A CREATIVE DIALOGUE WITH EUROPE. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ADJOURNING A DEBATE WHICH IS SO FUNDAMENTAL TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE ALLIANCE AND TO THE WEST.

40. EUROPE AND AMERICA FACE A FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE.

41. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS CONVINCED THAT OUR BASIC INTERESTS ARE INDIVISIBLE. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION WITH EUROPE IS UNIQUE ALIKE IN THE STRENGTH OF OUR COMMIT-

MENT AND IN THE KIND OF PUBLIC SUPPORT WHICH THIS COMMITMENT CAN COMMAND. BUT EUROPE MUST DECIDE WHETHER IT WISHES TO RETAIN THAT UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP.

42. HOW THEN DO WE CONCEIVE OUR FUTURE? THESE ARE THE REALITIES WE FACE:

-- DETENTE IS AN IMPERATIVE. IN THE WORLD SHADOWED BY THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST THERE IS NO RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE PURSUIT OF RELAXATION OF TENSIONS.

-- EUROPEAN UNITY IS A REALITY. THE UNITED STATES
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WELCOMES AND SUPPORTS IT IN ALL ITS DIMENSIONS -- POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC. WE BELIEVE IT MUST BE MADE IRREVERSIBLE.

-- COMMON DEFENSE IS A NECESSITY. BUT WE MUST BE PREPARED TO SHARE BURDENS EQUITABLY AND TO ADJUST DEFENSE TO CHANGING CONDITIONS TOGETHER -- ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, INSTEAD OF SPREADING GROUNDLESS FEARS.

-- ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IS A FACT. WE MUST WORK FOR OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT OR OUR ECONOMIC RIVALRY COULD TEAR THE FABRIC OF OUR ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP.

43. TO DEAL WITH THESE REALITIES WE MUST SOLVE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

-- MUST WE BECOME RIVALS OR CAN WE REMAIN ALLIES? WILL WE CREATE A PARTNERSHIP OF SHARED GOALS AND ASPIRATIONS OR WILL WE BECOME A TRANSITORY CONNECTION OF TWO BLOCS DEFINING THEIR IDENTITIES THROUGH RIVALRY?

-- CAN WE DEVELOP POLITICAL AND MILITARY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS THAT OUR PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT AT A TIME OF LESSENING INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS? WE MUST ASK OURSELVES WHAT IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR THE ALLIANCE -- MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY -- IN THE POLITICAL SETTING THAT IS LIKELY TO PREVAIL IN THIS DECADE AND BEYOND.

-- CAN WE FIND A COMMON DEFINITION OF THE NATURE OF DETENTE? WE MUST RECONCILE THE INDIVISIBILITY OF OUR SECURITY WITH THE FLEXIBILITY OF POLICY WE ALL REQUIRE. IT WOULD BE IRONIC INDEED IF EASED TENSIONS WITH ADVERSARIES ERODED THE UNITY AMONG FRIENDS THAT MADE DETENTE POSSIBLE.

-- CAN WE RESOLVE THE PARADOX OF OUR GROWING
INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE SIMULTANEOUS PRESSURES FOR
INDEPENDENCE TO WHICH EACH OF US IS SUBJECT? WE
MUST MAKE AN EFFORT TO DEFINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE

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ALLIANCE HAS COMMON CONCERNS BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE
ATLANTIC AREA.

-- CAN WE IMPROVE CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS? MUTUAL
TIMELY, AND CANDID CONSULTATION IS A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE
OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS IS NOT A MECHANICAL PROBLEM.
WE MUST BE AS CONCERNED WITH WHAT WILL FLOW
THROUGH OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATION AS WE ARE WITH
ESTABLISHING THOSE LINES. AND THE EXCHANGE MUST RUN
IN BOTH DIRECTIONS.

44. THESE ARE THE QUESTIONS WE POSED BY OUR INITIATIVE
LAST APRIL. AND THESE ARE THE QUESTIONS WHICH REMAIN
TO BE ANSWERED.

45. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE IS CLEAR: WE WILL SPARE
NO EFFORT TO DEVELOP A NEW COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP
WITH EUROPE, TO STRESS THE COMMUNITY OF OUR PURPOSES
AND THE COMMONALITY OF OUR INTERESTS. WE SEEK A NEW
ERA OF POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENT AND CREATIVITY AMONG THE
COUNTRIES BORDERING THE NORTH ATLANTIC.

46. THE LEADERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ARE MEETING
THIS WEEK. THEY ON THEIR PART WILL CONSIDER WHAT A
EUROPEAN IDENTITY MEANS AND DISCUSS HOW THESE
COUNTRIES CAN ADOPT COMMON POLICIES. I WISH TO
UNDERSCORE THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

47. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT EUROPEAN UNITY, BUT WE ALSO
BELIEVE THAT ATLANTIC UNITY AND EUROPEAN UNITY
ARE ESSENTIAL TO ONE ANOTHER AND THAT OUR INTERESTS
CONVERGE IN THE SHARED IDEALS WHICH NOURISH OUR
SOCIETIES, THE ECONOMIC SINEWS THAT BIND OUR NATIONS,
THE COMMON THREAT TO OUR PURPOSES AND VALUES AND,
ABOVE ALL, THE COMMON SEARCH FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE
THAT INSPIRES US ALL.

48. CONCRETE STEPS ARE CLEARLY REQUIRED NOW. WE
WOULD WELCOME THE SUGGESTION OF OTHERS. FOR OUR PART
WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS.

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49. FIRST, WE MUST COMPLETE WORK ON THE DECLARATIONS. IN OUR VIEW THE PRESENT CONTENT IS NOT SATISFACTORY -- ESPECIALLY THE DECLARATION WITH THE COMMUNITY -- BUT WE WOULD HOPE FOR FURTHER THOUGHT FROM OUR ALLIES. I MUST STRESS HOWEVER THAT, WHATEVER THEIR CONTENT, IF THEY ARE PERCEIVED BY OUR PUBLICS TO EMERGE FROM AN ADVERSARY PROCEDURE THEY WILL BE DRAINED OF MUCH SIGNIFICANCE. IN RECENT WEEKS OUR DIFFERENCES HAVE BEEN MADE APPARENT FOR ALL TO SEE. IT IS, THEREFORE, ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT NOW TO REAFFIRM THOSE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON WHICH WE ARE ALL AGREED.

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 RSC-01 DRC-01 SS-20 SSO-00 CCO-00 ISO-00

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50. SECOND, TAKING THE DECLARATIONS AS A STARTING POINT, LET US TRANSFORM THE WORDS OF THESE DOCUMENTS INTO PRACTICAL AND PERCEPTIBLE PROGRESS. WE CAN REGAIN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IF OUR POLICIES REINFORCE RATHER THAN UNDERMINE OUR FUNDAMENTAL COMMON INTERESTS.

51. TO ENSURE THAT OUR NEW COMMITMENT TO CONSULT AND COOPERATE ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN IS MORE THAN AN ABSTRACTION, WE SUGGEST THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES IN PERMANENT SESSION URGENTLY DEVELOP A MORE SYSTEMATIC PROGRAM OF CONSULTATIONS. SOME YEARS AGO WE SUGGESTED THAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS MIGHT MEET PERIODICALLY TO CONSULT ON MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN. TODAY WE SUGGEST THAT OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS, PERHAPS POLITICAL DIRECTORS, MIGHT JOIN THE COUNCIL IN PERMANENT SESSION FOLLOWING NATO MINISTERIALS AND

AND REGULAR INTERVALS BOTH TO PURSUE MATTERS RAISED BY THE
MINISTERS AND TO CONSIDER OTHER ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST.
THE MOST URGENT ISSUE IS THE DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS ARISING
OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE AREA WHICH MAY NEVERTHELESS AFFECT
THE SECURITY AND PROGRESS OF THE ATLANTIC AREA. THE
UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE FRANKLY

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AND FULLY IN THIS ENTERPRISE.

52. THIRD, WE MUST ENSURE THAT OUR MOST URGENT COMMON
CONCERN -- ENERGY -- UNITES RATHER THAN DIVIDES US. WE
MUST APPLY OUR ENORMOUS TALENTS AND STRENGTHS IN A
CONCERTED CAMPAIGN TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM THAT ALL
OF US CONFRONT TOGETHER.

53. WE FACE THREE DISTINCT CHALLENGES:

-- IN THE SHORT TERM THE ARAB EMBARGO AND
RESTRICTIONS ON PRODUCTION.

-- IN THE MEDIUM TERM THE NECESSITY FOR
COOPERATION AMONG CONSUMERS AND PRODUCERS TO EXPAND SUPPLY
FOR A REASONABLE RETURN AND AT A REASONABLE COST.

-- IN THE LONG TERM THE REQUIREMENT TO FIND
ALTERNATE SOURCES OF ENERGY.

54. I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED OUR BELIEF THAT THE
SHORT TERM PROBLEM CAN ONLY BE SOLVED BY
PROGRESS TOWARD A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, AND THAT SUCH PROGRESS WILL COME MORE
RAPIDLY IF EUROPE AND AMERICA CONCERT THEIR DIPLOMATIC
EFFORTS.

55. TO MEET THE MEDIUM AND LONG TERM CHALLENGES THE
UNITED STATES WILL MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AT A VERY EARLY
DATE.

56. ABOVE ALL, WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP
HAS BEEN SUSTAINED BY THE INTANGIBLES OF CONFIDENCE, TRUST
AND FRIENDSHIP. THESE SHOULD NOT BE LIGHTLY
SACRIFICED FOR ABSTRACT PROCEDURAL AND LEGALISTIC
DEPARTURES. COMPARED TO WHAT WE FACE -- THE GROWING
SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, THE UPHEAVAL IN THE DEVELOPING
NATIONS, THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE A NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM --
OUR DIFFERENCES ARE ALMOST IRRELEVANT.

57. IF WE WISH TO PRESERVE OUR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE,

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OUR SECURITY AND OUR MATERIAL PROSPERITY, WE MUST ARREST
THE CURRENT TREND WHICH WE ALL PERCEIVE WITH CONCERN BUT
WHICH WE HAVE THUS FAR BEEN UNWILLING TO ATTACK JOINTLY.
A QUARTER CENTURY AGO MEN OF VISION ON BOTH SIDES OF
THE ATLANTIC MET SUCH A CHALLENGE TO THE WESTERN WORLD.
TODAY WE MUST AGAIN RISE TO THE THREAT POSED TO OUR
NATIONS AND OUR PEOPLES WITH A VISION OF WHAT WE CAN
ACCOMPLISH TOGETHER, AS WELL AS AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT
WILL HAPPEN IF WE REMAIN APART. THE UNITED STATES IS PRE-
PARED, AND ASKS ONLY THAT WE REDEDICATE OURSELVES TO
THAT GREAT GOAL OF ATLANTIC COOPERATION WHICH HAS BROUGHT
PEACE AND PROSPERITY TO ALL OUR PEOPLES.

END TEXT. KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 15 APR 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 DEC 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: willialc
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973USNATO06052
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS, 12/31/81
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: USNATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731258/dcicgaaj.tel
Line Count: 830
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRETARY
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 16
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRETARY <gwr 19990421 telegram text was secret>; SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: willialc
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27-Aug-2001 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <15-Oct-2001 by willialc>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 19990421
Subject: SECRETARY'S NAC STATEMENT
TAGS: PEPR,NAC
To: STATE NIACT
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005